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Abstract
One of the primary desired capabilities of any future air traffic separation management
system is the ability to provide early conflict detection and resolution effectively and effi-
ciently. In this paper, we consider the risk of conflict as a primary measurement to be used
for early conflict detection. This paper focuses on developing a novel approach to assess
the impact of different measurement uncertainty models on the estimated risk of conflict.
The measurement uncertainty model can be used to represent different sensor accuracy and
sensor choices. Our study demonstrates the value of modelling measurement uncertainty in
the conflict risk estimation problem and presents techniques providing a means of assessing
sensor requirements to achieve desired conflict detection performance.
Keywords: Risk-ratio, Conflict Risk, Separation Management, Radar Accuracy, Particle
Filters
Introduction
Air transport is recognized as one of the fastest growing areas within the transport sector [1].
Projections indicate that air traffic could double over the next ten years. The increasing demand
for air travel is starting to stress air traffic management system (ATM) towards its limits [2]. In
response to this projected growth, there has been much work in the area of next generation air
traffic management, two examples are the Single European Sky ATM Research Programme
(SESAR) in Europe and the NextGen project in the US [3]. For example, the NextGen
project employs a new concept of air traffic operation which allows aircraft the flexibility of
changing flight routes in response to different conditions [4]–[6], as a result, the responsibility
of ensuring safe separation has been delegated to individual aircraft. This new responsibility
requires individual aircraft to have a decentralized separation management system on-board
that is capable of monitoring and resolving any potential conflicts in-flight [7], where conflict
in this context is defined as an event between two aircraft where the separation distance is
less than the critical separation distance [8].
The aim of any separation management systems is to predict if a conflict is going to occur,
and communicate any detected conflicts to a human operator, and to assist in the resolution
of the conflict situation [14]. To successfully detect a conflict, the traffic environment must be
first monitored, then appropriate state information must be collected and disseminated using
sensors and appropriate communication equipment. The collected state information provides
an estimate of the current traffic situation. An aircraft dynamic model is also needed to
project any state knowledge into the future so that it is possible to predict whether a conflict
will occur at some future time epoch. This prediction can be solely based on collected state
information or may be based on additional information, such as flight plans or knowledge of
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sensor accuracy. However, there is generally some uncertainty in the values of the collected
states due to sensor errors or limited update rate [14].
Risk of conflict is defined as product of the probability and consequences of the conflict
event. Generally, risk of conflict cannot be determined directly, because the probability of the
conflict event is difficult to quantify. There has been some research on improved quantification
of the risk of conflict over the past decade; however, research on the estimated risk of conflict
has often focused on different aspects and from different perspectives [9]. Young, for example,
describes risk concept using measurement of new technologies’ readiness level (TRLs) [13].
Young’s risk concept has been used to assess the maturity of new technologies as a means of
evaluating their readiness for incorporation in new aircraft systems. Rather than quantifying the
estimated risk itself, Young focuses on presenting a risk characterisation framework. Research
in this area has usually approached the conflict risk estimation problem using a probabilistic
calculation method [9]. In most probabilistic calculation methods, the error in estimation
tends to grow quadratically with time [9]. However, some previous research has addressed
the importance of using additional information in estimating conflict risk [7]. One example
of using additional information to estimate the risk of conflict is to incorporate aircraft intent
information. By using additional intent information, unnecessary uncertainties in conflict risk
estimation can be reduced [7]. However, in the NextGen concept, aircraft intent information
could dynamically change over time, thus a key limitation of this approach is that the quality
of estimated risk of conflict information depends on the accuracy of the intent information.
In this paper, we assess the impact of different sensor accuracy and sensor choices on the
estimated risk of conflict using a risk-ratio analysis. The presented risk-ratio concept can also
be used to determine which critical information among different sensors has a greater impact
on the risk-ratio.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II formulates the conflict estimation and risk-
ratio concepts using dynamic state space model. Section III describes the particle filter
implementation for our risk-ratio estimation problem. Section IV provides a simulation study
that compares the impact of different sensor choices on the estimated risk-ratio. Section V
draws some conclusions.
Problem Formulation & Definition of Assessment Criteria
Dynamic State Space Model
In this paper, we classify aircraft into two basic types: observer aircraft and target aircraft.
The observer aircraft is an aircraft that is capable of measuring the relative bearing and range
information of another aircraft. A target aircraft is an aircraft observed by the observer aircraft.
By convention, the observer aircraft is the first aircraft (1) in our description, with the state
of observer aircraft denoted as x1t ∈ R4. We assume there are N targets within the target













where xrt ∈ R4 is the target aircraft state. xrt (q) denotes the qth element of the state of target









]>, where xrt (1) and xrt (3) denote x, y
directions respectively and xrt (2) = ˙xrt (1), x
r
t (4) =
˙xrt (3). Here yrt ∈ RQ is the target aircraft
observation, and Q is the dimension of measurement variables. Here f(·) : R4 → R4 and
h(·) : R4 → RQ are the system dynamics and measurement process respectively. The process
noise vrt and the measurement noise u
r
t are assumed to be mutually uncorrelated, with their
densities being ψv and ψu, respectively.
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The distance between the target aircraft and an observer aircraft D(xrt , x
1






(xrt (1)− x1t (1))2 + (xrt (3)− x1t (3))2, (2)
Risk of Conflict Estimation
The estimated risk of conflict is based on our knowledge of the current state and any
additional information that we may have.
We define the conflict between a target aircraft and an observer aircraft using an indicator





1, if D(xrt , x
1
t ) ≤ Dcr
0, Otherwise, (3)
where C(·, ·) is a function of the states xrt and x1t , and Dcr is defined as the critical separation
distance.
We will let Pr(C(xrt , x
1
t )) denote the probability of the conflict event at time instant t.
Now we can define our risk of conflict Rt based on this conflict probability, as the product





t ) = Bc × Pr(C(xrt , x1t )). (4)
To allow us to consider the impact of different models on estimated risk of conflict, we
introduce λ to denote the model under consideration, the estimated risk of conflict based on
observed information can be expressed as:
Rτ |t(λ) = E[Rτ (xrτ , x
1
τ )|y0,t, λ], (5)
where E[Rτ (xrτ , x
1
τ )|y0,t, λ] is the expected value of Rτ at time instant τ , based on measure-
ments up to time t using model λ. Here τ = t + ` and ` ∈ [0, Tp] represents the prediction
length, and Tp is the upper limit of the prediction length. Whilst Rτ |t(λ) is estimated risk of
conflict at time instant τ , it is also important to estimate the risk of conflict during the next
period of time. To describe the worst conflict situation during the period [t, t+Tp], we define
our future estimated risk of conflict as the maximum estimated risk of conflict that occurs





Risk-ratio is a relative measure of the safety benefit from changes in the procedure or
equipment [25]. For air traffic separation management systems, safety is measured in terms
of the estimated risk of conflict, or perhaps by our quantity Rmt|Tp(λ). [19]. When we want to
evaluate the utility of a model λ, it may be useful to quantify its performance of a nominal
model (λ◦) using the concept of risk-ratio. For these reasons, the risk-ratio on interval [t, t+Tp]







where Rmt|Tp(λ), defined by equation (6), is the future estimated risk of conflict using model
under test.
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Calculation of Risk Quantities
In order to compute the estimated risk of conflict, we need to first estimate the probability
of conflict. In this study, we will numerically estimate Pr(C(·, ·)) using a particle filter
approach, see [21] for algorithms. Particle filter is a approximate non-linear filter for discrete
time nonlinear state-space models relating a hidden state xk to the observation yk. By using
particle filter algorithms, our proposed techniques can be applied to more general cases than
possible using Kalman filter based estimate concepts.
We will let estimated risk of conflict R¯k+p|k and our future estimated risk-of-conflict R¯mk|Tp
correspond to the particle filter estimate Rt+p|t (described in Eqn 5) and Rmt|Tp (described
in Eqn 6), respectively. We also let our estimate risk ratio F¯k|Tp(λ, λ◦) be the particle filter
estimate corresponding to:
F¯k|Tp(λ, λ
◦) = E[Ft|Tp(λ, λ
◦)], (8)
where Tp is the upper limit of the prediction length under consideration.
Simulation Study and Results
Simulation Implementation
The particle filters were implemented in the MATLAB R©simulation environment using
ReBEL version 0.2.7. ReBEL is a MATLAB R© toolkit of functions and scripts, designed
to facilitate sequential Bayesian estimation in general state space models [23]. The software
consolidates research on new methods for recursive Bayesian estimation and Kalman filtering.
Simulation Setup
In the following simulations, we consider different cases of one maneuvering target aircraft
observed by other nearby aircraft. The sensor under consideration is located on the observer
aircraft. The target aircraft dynamics are modeled in Cartesian coordinates as xk = Hxk−1 +
Gvk−1 where the states of the target are position and velocity in each of the two Cartesian
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where T is the sampling period. The standard deviation of the process noise is 0.1.
We first present an illustrative case showing estimated risk of conflict in a single head-on
collision case, followed by two studies: Head-on Conflicts and Crossing Conflicts. In all our
studies, state estimation for the target is performed using a particle filter.
We have four different measurement uncertainty models in our first study (Head-on Con-
flicts). The first measurement uncertainty model is based on bearing only information, the
second measurement uncertainty model is based on both range and bearing information (radar
observation), the third measurement uncertainty model is based on latitude and longitude
information from automatic dependent surveillance-boardcast (ADS-B), and the forth mea-
surement uncertainty model is based on range, bearing, latitude and longitude information
(Radar + ADS-B). Here, range and bearing angle information is measured through a single
sensor (radar). The range and bearing transformations are given by r =
√
x2 + y2, and
θ = arctan(y/x) respectively. Within these four models, the longitude and latitude information
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Fig. 1. Study 1 (Head-on Conflicts): Figure shows trajectories for four different scenarios respectively. Each black aircraft
represents the target aircraft in a different scenario labeled Case I, Case II, Case III and Case IV. The white aircraft
represents the observer aircraft which is the same in each scenario. The circle represent the critical separation distance for
the observer aircraft at one particular time instant. The minimum separation distance achieved in these four scenarios are
46m, 234m, 488m and 547m respectively, Case I, Case II and Case III represent conflict cases and Case IV represents a
non-conflict case.
is obtained through ADS-B, and they are represented by x and y respectively. The sensor
measurement noise wk is assumed to follow a white Gaussian distribution with zero mean.
The values in the covariance matrix represent the accuracy of the sensors, both nominal
ADS-B noise standard deviation for latitude and longitude position measurements as well
as nominal radar range and bearing errors are derived from RNP-1, which is short for a
Required Navigation Performance of 1 nautical miles. (RNP is used as navigation specification
that includes requirement for on-board performance monitoring and alerting.) All simulations
involve a critical separation distance of 500m. In our simulation, the target tracking algorithms
are initialized near the actual target states.
We performed four different scenarios in our first study (Head-on Conflicts). In each of the
scenarios, the observer aircraft travels from west to east and the target aircraft travels from
east with different bearing angle as indicated in Figure 1. The major difference between these
four scenarios is the minimum separation distance achieved between the observer aircraft and
target aircraft. Case I, II and III represent conflict cases, while Case IV represents a non-
conflict case. In all four cases, the target aircraft starts at a location approximately 2000m
away from the observer. The velocity of the observer aircraft and target aircraft are both 100
knots (51.4m/s) [11]. All four different measurement uncertainty models were implemented
and applied to the scenarios to compare the impact on future estimated risk of conflict from
different sensor choices.
In our second study (Crossing Conflicts), we examined two different scenarios representing
a conflict case and a non-conflict case (as shown in Figure 2) and compare the impact of
varying range or bearing accuracy on the future estimated risk of conflict using the risk-ratio
concepts. The target aircraft starts at a location approximately 1500m away from the observer
aircraft. The observer aircraft has a bearing angle of 45 degrees for the conflict case and 30
degrees for the non-conflict case. The target aircraft travels from south to north, the velocity
of the observer aircraft and target aircraft are both set to 100knots (51.4m/s).
Simulation Results
Illustrative Case: Single Head-on Confict Case
In order to establish the relationship between time-to-conflict and quality of estimated risk
of conflict, we evaluated the estimated risk of conflict R¯k+p|k for simple head-on collision
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Fig. 2. Study 2 (Crossing Conflicts): Figure shows the trajectories for two different scenarios, the black aircraft represents
the target aircraft which is the same in each scenario. The white aircraft represents the observer aircraft in two scenarios
Case I and Case II. The circle represent the critical separation distance for the target aircraft at one particular time instant.
Fig. 3. Illustrative example of estimated risk of conflict at time instant k, prediction time p.
case. Figure 3 shows that the estimated risk of conflict R¯k+p|k decreases as the prediction
interval p increases. This occurs because the certainty in estimated risk of conflict increases as
range decreases. However, the aircraft could declare a conflict earlier; with lower confidence,
if earlier declaration is required to ensure that there is sufficient time to execute a suitable
avoidance maneuver. Therefore, there is a trade-off between time-to-conflict and accuracy of
estimated risk of conflict. In order to get an accurate estimate risk of conflict value (with
sufficient time to resolve the conflict), we need to understand how different measurement
uncertainty models impact on estimated risk of conflict. The relationship between measure-
ment uncertainty models and estimated risk of conflict is further explored in the following
subsection.
Study 1: Head-on Conflicts
In our first study, we use risk-ratio concepts to assess the impact of sensor choice on
the future estimated risk-of-conflict. In this study, sensor accuracy is set to RNP-1 (which
corresponding to a standard deviation of 944.92m for latitude, longitude, range measurements
and 0.492rad for bearing angle measurements). The future estimated risk-of-conflict R¯mt|Tp is
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TABLE I
Table of future estimated risk of conflict R¯m10|20 and risk-ratio F¯10|20(λ, λ
◦) with four different measurement uncertainty
models in conflict case
Sensor Choices




Estimated I 0.79 0.82 0.85 0.83
risk-of-
conflict II 0.73 0.80 0.82 0.80
R¯m10|20 III 0.63 0.74 0.71 0.73
Risk I 1 1.04 1.08 1.05
Ratio II 1 1.09 1.12 1.09
F¯10|20(λ, λ
◦) III 1 1.17 1.13 1.16
TABLE II
Table of future estimated risk-of-conflict R¯m10|20 and risk-ratio F¯10|20(λ, λ
◦) with four different measurement uncertainty
models in non-conflict case
Sensor Choices
Case Bearingonly (λ◦) Radar ADS-B
ADS-B
+ Radar
R¯m10|20 IV 0.39 0.20 0.25 0.22
F¯10|20(λ, λ
◦) IV 1 0.5 0.64 0.56
computed at t = 10 seconds using a maximum prediction length of Tp = 20 seconds. Table I
provides the results for the future estimated risk-of-conflict R¯mt|Tp and risk ratios F¯t|Tp(λ, λ
◦)
for the four measurement uncertainty models in conflict cases. Case I to Case III are conflict
cases in which the maximum value for conflict indicator function from 10th to 30th time
instant is equal to 1 (this is what conflict means). Bearing-only sensor model is considered
to be the the nominal model for the risk-ratio comparison study. Similarly, Table II provides
the results for the future estimated risk-of-conflict R¯mt|Tp and risk ratios F¯t|Tp(λ, λ
◦) for four
measurement uncertainty models in the non-conflict case. The value for conflict indicator
function during 10th to 30th time instant for the non-conflict case is 0 (this is what non-
conflict means).
For all conflict cases, a risk-ratio higher than 1 indicates better risk estimates than the
nominal model. A risk-ratio lower than 1 suggests that the model selected does not represent
the situation as accurately as the nominal model. For the non-conflict case, a risk-ratio lower
than 1 indicates better risk estimation than under the nominal model. In this situation, cases
when the risk-ratio is higher than 1 suggests that the model selected does not represent the
situation as accurately as the nominal model.
From Table I, we observed that the bearing-only sensor model performed slightly worse than
the other 3 sensor models, whilst ADS-B, radar and ADS-B + Radar model achieved similar
performance. Furthermore, for the same sensor choice and sensor accuracy, conflict geometry
also effects the ability to accurately estimate the future risk-of-conflict. In conflict cases
when the minimum separation distance achieved is close to the critical separation distance,
the estimation accuracy for future risk-of-conflict is reduced. This reduction in performance
is evident when comparing future estimated risk-of-conflict in different conflict cases.
Study 2: Crossing Conflicts
In our second study, we use risk-ratio concepts to assess the impact of sensor accuracy on
the future estimated risk-of-conflict in a crossing target situation. Nominal sensor accuracy of
RNP-1 is used in these simulations. In these simulations, conflict occurs when the minimum
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TABLE III
Table of future estimated risk-of-conflict R¯m5|20 and risk-ratio F¯5|20(λ, λ
◦) with varying bearing parameter A in a
non-conflict case
A 0.01 0.1 1 (λ◦) 10 100
R¯m5|20 0 0.032 0.04 0.09 0.12
F¯5|20(λ, λ
◦) 0 0.8 1 2.25 3
TABLE IV
Table of future estimated risk-of-conflict R¯m5|20 and risk-ratio F¯5|20(λ, λ
◦) with varying range parameter B in a
non-conflict case
B 0.01 0.1 1 (λ◦) 10 100
R¯m5|20 0 0 0.04 0.10 0.26
F¯5|20(λ, λ
◦) 0 0 1 2.5 6.5
distance achieved between observer and target aircraft is less than 500m. The future estimated
risk-of-conflict R¯mt|Tp is computed at t = 5 second with a maximum prediction length of
Tp = 20 seconds. Here we define A and B as the bearing and range accuracy modification
factors respectively (e.g. A = 10 is equivalent to a bearing accuracy of RNP-10). By choosing
different values for A and B, we can model the impact of different radar bearing and range
observation accuracies. The future estimated risk-of-conflict R¯mt|Tp and risk-ratio F¯t|Tp(λ, λ
◦)
compared with the nominal model is shown in Table III while the parameter A varies from
0.01 to 100 and parameter B is fixed to 1. Table IV compares the future estimated risk-of-
conflict R¯mt|Tp and risk-ratio F¯t|Tp(λ, λ
◦) when varying parameter B from 0.01 to 100 (A = 1).
For the non-conflict case in Table III-IV, a risk-ratio lower than 1 indicates improved
quality of future estimated risk-of-conflict when compared to the performance achieved under
the nominal model. In cases when the risk-ratio is higher than 1 indicates a lower quality of
estimated risk-of-conflict compared to the performance achieved under the nominal model.
When either parameter A or B were decreased, as seen in Table III and Table IV, better
future estimated risk-of-conflict resulted. Table III-IV also demonstrate that a false alarm
could possibly be produced if excessive measurement noise was present in study 2: Crossing
Conflicts (e.g. a large A or B value).
When comparing the radar accuracy impact on the future estimated risk-of-conflict and
risk-ratio in a conflict case, the minimum separation distance achieved during the simulation
is 459m. Table V compares the future estimated risk-of-conflict and risk-ratio when varying
the A factor from 0.01 to 100 (B = 1). Table VI shows the future estimated risk-of-conflict
TABLE V
Table of future estimated risk-of-conflict R¯m5|20, and risk-ratio F¯5|20(λ, λ
◦) with varying parameter A in a conflict case
A 0.01 0.1 1 (λ◦) 10 100
R¯m5|20 0.95 0.77 0.75 0.37 0.37
F¯5|20(λ, λ
◦) 1.27 1.027 1 0.49 0.49
TABLE VI
Table of future estimated risk-of-conflict R¯m5|20 and risk-ratio F¯5|20(λ, λ
◦) with varying parameter B in a conflict case
B 0.01 0.1 1 (λ◦) 10 100
R¯m5|20 0.99 0.98 0.75 0.71 0.65
F¯5|20(λ, λ
◦) 1.32 1.31 1 0.95 0.92
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R¯m5|20 and risk-ratio F¯5|20(λ, λ
◦) for a varying B factor from 0.01 to 100 in a conflict case
(A = 1). In conflict cases, a risk-ratio higher than 1 indicates improved future estimated
risk-of-conflict when compared to the performance achieved under the nominal model. A
risk-ratio lower than 1 indicates that the model selected does not represent the situation as
accurately as the nominal model.
Table III-VI also shows only a marginal decrease in the error between future estimated
risk-of-conflict and the corresponding conflict indicator function in cases where greater sensor
accuracy is used. For example, for a measurement uncertainty model in which sensor accuracy
is equal to RNP-0.1, the quality of future estimated risk-of-conflict is only marginally lower
than that obtained in model where sensor accuracy is equal to RNP-0.01. This observation
implies that sensors do not need to be excessively accurate in order to obtain a good quality
future estimated risk-of-conflict. It is also evident from Table III-VI that within the same
sensor choice, higher sensor accuracy corresponds to more accurate risk estimations.
Discussion of Results
The results from our simulations can be interpreted in the following three ways.
Firstly, in terms of prediction horizon, the results of simulation study suggest that sensor
accuracy effects the length over which reliable prediction is possible. In other words, with
higher sensor accuracy, we can predict relatively further ahead in time.
Secondly, in terms of sensor choices, the radar observation model performs slightly better
in assessing the future estimated risk-of-conflict compared with bearing-only sensor model.
This is expected because the radar observation model provides additional range information.
The risk-ratio analysis also shows that the radar model, ADS-B model and ADS-B+radar
model have similar performance in assessing the future estimated risk-of-conflict. The risk-
ratio analysis implies that the separation management system does not significantly benefit
from additional sensor measurements (if the additional sensors have similar accuracy, at the
same data rate). However, aircraft separation management system can benefit from ADS-B’s
high update rates compared to the radar measurement rates. This risk-ratio approach helps to
quantify the risk-of-conflict benefits brought about by combining different sensor systems.
Thirdly, in terms of sensor accuracy, our simulation results show that estimation improves
as sensor accuracy increases. The improved estimation characteristics are illustrated through
larger risk-ratios in conflict cases and smaller risk-ratios in non-conflict cases. However, the
case studies also suggest that sensors do not need to be excessively accurate in order to
obtain reasonably accurate estimation of the risk-of-conflict. Furthermore, the case studies
also indicate that conflict geometry impacts on the accuracy of risk-of-conflict estimation,
especially at the boundary of the conflict zone.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a new risk-ratio based approach for assessing the impact of
sensor accuracy and sensor choice on the ability to accurately predict conflicts. The proposed
risk-ratio based approach was implemented using particle filter estimation and prediction
techniques. Use of particle filters allows consideration of more complex aviation scenarios
and can includes the non-linear characteristics of measurement devices.
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